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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  effectiveness  of climate  policy  strongly  depends  on how  these  measures  are  imple-
mented.  National  policy  measures  may  have  international  spillover  effects  which  partly
neutralize  domestic  emission  reduction,  while  different  types  of policy  measures  may  off-
set  each  other  as  well. This paper  explores  the  conditions  for these  interaction  effects  by
using  a  concise  partial-equilibrium  two-country  model  of  the  electricity  market  which  also
includes a system  for emissions  trading.  We  ﬁnd  that  the  international  spillover  effects
not  only  depend  on the  integration  of  electricity  markets,  but also  on  the  tightness  of the
emissions-trading  system.  We  show  that  this  tightness  is negatively  related  to the degree
the supply  of  renewable  energy  is stimulated.  We  ﬁnd  that  the  more  renewable  energy  is
stimulated,  the  less  domestic  reduction  in  carbon  emissions  is  offset  by spillover  effects.  A
more binding  cap in the  emissions-trading  system  makes  national  policies  less  effective.
Hence,  if climate-policy  measures  such  as subsidies  for renewable  energy  make  the  cap  in
the  trading  scheme  less  binding,  these  climate-policy  measures  become  more  effective.
© 2018  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
In order to reduce carbon emissions in the power sector, governments are implementing a set of policy measures. These
easures vary from subsidies for renewable-energy techniques to taxes on fossil-fuel electricity production and mechanisms
or trading in emission rights. While some measures are taken on national level, others have an international character.
ithin the EU, the implementation of climate policies is pursued by the European Commission. The Renewable Energy
irective (2009/28/EC), for instance, sets a binding target of 20 percent ﬁnal energy consumption from renewable sources
y 2020. Each EU Member State has to realize the renewable-energy target, but these countries are free to choose their own
olicies to stimulate deployment of renewable-energy sources. EU countries utilize different measures for this purpose,
uch as feed-in-tariff subsidies and quota systems (Haas et al., 2010). In addition to this, several countries are considering
o impose constraints on conventional power plants, in particular coal-ﬁred power plants (EIA, 2014; EZ, 2015). These
easures vary from implementing additional environmental standards (e.g. on fuel efﬁciency or emissions per unit) making
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it complicated if not impossible for (old) coal-ﬁred power plants to operate or imposing a carbon tax which in particular
raise the generation costs of coal-ﬁred power plants. Besides this set of different national policy measures to reduce carbon
emissions by the power sector, an emissions-trading system has been implemented on EU level. This EU Emission Trading
System (ETS) is the largest cap and trade mechanism for CO2 emissions in the world. It sets up a cap on the total amount
of CO2 emitted by installations of ﬁrms subject to this scheme. This cap is annually reduced in order to realize an overall
reduction in carbon emissions. The initial allocation of the cap to participants was initially done by grandfathering, but more
and more auctioning is used as allocation method (European Commission, 2012). In the secondary market, participants
can trade in permits which results in a carbon price. Meanwhile, the European Commission is promoting the integration
of national electricity markets to facilitate border-free trading across Europe, see (Keay, 2013). As a result, national power
markets have become more closely integrated with each other, which may  increase the international spillovers of national
climate policies.
It is well established in economic literature that the coexistence of different types of climate policies may have coun-
teracting effects (Schmalensee, 2012; Goulder, 2013; Böhringer et al., 2016). This holds in particular when a cap-and-trade
emissions scheme is implemented. In that case, theoretically, the level of emissions is only determined by the cap in the
emissions-trading scheme (Tietenberg, 2006). If the cap remains the same, other instruments only affect the costs of reaching
that target, but not the amount of emissions. If an emissions trading scheme is combined with subsidies for solar panels,
for instance, it can be expected that the emissions within the power sector are reduced which lowers the overall demand
for and, hence, the price of emissions permits, which in turn can stimulate other ﬁrms participating within the emissions
trading scheme to raise their emissions since emitting has become cheaper (see e.g. van den Bergh et al., 2013; Böhringer
and Rosendahl, 2011). This effect is called the waterbed effect of climate policy.
In this paper, we explore the conditions for the interaction effects to occur. For that purpose, we  analyze the interaction
of three types of policy measures to realize a transition of the electricity industry based on fossil fuels towards an industry
with a lower level of carbon emissions. These policy measures are subsidies for renewable electricity, a carbon tax for
fossil-fuel power plants and an international emissions trading scheme. The choice for these three types of policy measures
(emissions trading, subsidies renewables and carbon tax) is based on the fact that all three types of measures are currently
implemented or discussed, albeit to a different extent in several European countries. In the Netherlands, for instance, the
government recently decided to implement a carbon tax on top of the European emission trading scheme and several
domestic support schemes for renewable energy in order to realize a minimum price for carbon. In this paper we do not
discuss the pros and cons of the individual climate-policy instruments as subsidies, taxes and emissions trading. Although
one can discuss which instrument is best equipped to realise carbon reduction in a cost-effective way  (see e.g. Aldy et al.,
2010), in practice governments use packages of different types of instruments (Hughes and Urpelainen, 2015; Kautto et al.,
2012; Del Rio and Mir-Artigues, 2014; Sijm, 2005). Therefore it is also important to understand how they inﬂuence each
other.
As we want to analyze the interaction among various climate-policy measures, we build a concise stylized model of two
connected electricity markets combined with a regional emissions-trading market. In this model, some electricity producers
are perceived as strategic players, hence they can exercise market power and inﬂuence the wholesale prices. Such a model
is fairly well equipped to simulate the situation with a few centralized power producers, as it exists in several European
countries such as the Dutch and German electricity market (see also Willems et al., 2009; Mulder et al., 2015; ten Cate and
Lijesen, 2004). We  take the stochastic nature of both supply and demand into account. Firms base their decisions regarding
investments and the dispatch of plants on expected values for weather conditions, load levels and scarcity levels. Including
probability distributions for wind and demand allows us to control for the volatility of market conditions in the power
market. International trade is based on price-arbitrage opportunities. The size of the cross-border transmission capacity
determines the potential magnitude of international trade and, hence, the potential cross-border spillover effects. The two
countries in this model differ in size, so we have a large and a small country. Differences in scale of countries are important
to consider in order to better assess international spillover effects from policies implemented in the different countries. One
may expect that the magnitude of the spillover effects are highest when they originate from a large country and affect a
neighboring country smaller in size. As an international carbon permit market is added to the electricity market, the carbon
price is part of the variable generation costs of fossil-fuel producers. In addition, countries may  implement a carbon tax on
electricity producers. In order to also analyze the international spillover effects of different national policies, we  assume
that the carbon tax is only implemented in one country at the same time. Countries are also able to stimulate renewable-
electricity generation by giving subsidies which are ﬁnanced by a tax on electricity consumption. The model is calibrated
to more or less reﬂect the current characteristics of the German and Dutch power market. The objective of this calibration
is just to have a reasonable benchmark for the numerical analysis, not to make realistic simulations of the power markets
in these countries. The numerical analysis remains of a stylized nature with the purpose to explore the conditions for the
occurrence of interaction effects among climate-policy instruments.
Using the numerical application of our model, we ﬁnd that combining the three different climate-policy measures, includ-
ing an emissions-trading system, may  have a net effect on the level of carbon emissions, despite of the above-mentioned
waterbed effect. This result comes from the fact that the carbon price in the trading scheme has a ﬂoor, i.e. it can never be
lower than zero. This means that when other climate-policy measures are effective in reducing the demand for permits, they
may also neutralize the waterbed effect. Our ﬁndings show that implementing national policies on top of an international
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ax on top of an emissions trading scheme may  result in more emissions reductions as the waterbed effect does not always
ork, this does not mean that such a policy is efﬁcient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We  review relevant literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe
he key elements of the partial equilibrium model of the wholesale electricity market and deﬁne how the market equilibrium
s determined. Section 4 presents the results for the policy variants. Section 5, ﬁnally, concludes.
. Literature
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature of power market modeling and interaction effects of climate policies.
 key question regarding the modelling of the electricity market is how to deal with strategic behaviour. Willems et al. (2009)
ompare two oligopolistic models of the electricity market: Cournot and Supply Function Equilibrium.1 They show that both
odels explain roughly the same fraction of the observed price variations in the German electricity market. Furthermore,
hey suggest to use Cournot model for short-term model analysis as such a model can easily accommodate additional market
onditions such as network constraints. Mulder et al. (2015) apply the Cournot model to the Dutch electricity market taking
oth the intermittent wind energy supply and fringe suppliers by Combined Heat and Power (i.e., CHP) into account. As a
esult of the intermittent and fringe supplies, the wholesale prices tend to be lower. Using a competitive equilibrium model
ithout strategic behavior among power generators, Saguan and Meeus (2014) investigate the interaction between cross-
order transmission investments and renewable-energy policies. Their main conclusion is that renewable energy trade in
rder to comply with each member state targets is beneﬁcial for both zones, but that an imperfect regulatory framework for
ransmission investment creates a signiﬁcant cost for realising renewable-energy targets. In our model, some “big” producers
re perceived as strategic players, hence they can exercise market power and inﬂuence the wholesale prices. Such a model
airly well resembles the situation with a few centralized power producers, such as in the Dutch and German electricity
arket.
Using several different models including partial equilibrium models and general equilibrium models, Calderón et al.
2016) ﬁnd signiﬁcant CO2 reductions through high carbon prices and abatement targets in Colombia. Benavente (2016)
ses a computable general equilibrium model to examine the impact of a carbon tax in Chile. They conclude that such a
olicy is effective at reducing carbon emissions but at the cost of GDP losses. Ellerton and Fullteron (2014) ﬁnd that a carbon
ax on electricity in the U.S. can generate net negative domestic leakage as it raises the costs for other industries, which
esults in lower demand and, hence, lower production levels and carbon emissions by these industries. This impact of higher
osts in the power industry on overall carbon emissions was also found by McKibbin et al. (2014). These authors conclude
hat the domestic carbon emissions outside the power sector decrease as higher electricity prices slow overall economic
ctivity. Note that the above-mentioned papers only consider domestic carbon tax to reduce domestic carbon emissions. In
 more than one country setting, Elliott et al. (2010) conﬁrms that a uniform tax among all member countries is effective at
educing carbon emissions.
In the above mentioned literature, the analysis of interaction of carbon taxes with other climate policies is not taken into
ccount. From literature on emissions trading we  know that the coexistence of different types of climate policies may  have
ounteracting effects. When a cap-and-trade emissions scheme is implemented, the level of emissions is determined by the
ap in the emissions-trading scheme (Tietenberg, 2006). If the cap remains the same, other instruments only affect the costs
f reaching that target, but not necessarily the amount of emissions (see e.g. van den Bergh et al., 2013). As a result, the ﬁnal
evel of emissions remains unchanged while the contribution of different emitters to this overall level has changed, which
aises the costs of reaching the cap. Böhringer and Rosendahl (2011) ﬁnd that the costs of realising a CO2 reduction target of
5% increase by more than 60% if the percentage renewable energy is stimulated by more than 10%. In other words: in case of
n emissions-trading scheme, other measures directed at realising emission reduction merely affect the level as well as the
llocation of costs of reaching the emission cap among the participants of the trading scheme without affecting the overall
evel of emissions (i.e. the beneﬁts in terms of reductions of emissions remain the same). Because of this interaction effect,
öhringer (2014) concludes in his overview of two decades of European Climate policy, that renewable-energy subsidies
nd energy-efﬁciency mandates can result in higher costs for realising energy savings, energy efﬁciency improvements, and
uel switching than in case of a stand-alone cap-and-trade system. The effectiveness of climate policy can also seriously be
educed through carbon leakage. Caron et al. (2015), for instance, show that the cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme
n California may  result in an increase of emissions in neighboring markets which may  neutralize about half of the realized
eduction by the scheme.
From these papers, we  learn that combining different types of climate-policy measures reduces the cost-effectiveness of
limate policy. This strand of literature also states that adding other policy instruments to a system of emissions trading does
ot result in any additional emissions reduction (Sijm, 2005; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). The arguments in favour of other policy
easures, such as subsidies for renewable energy, are derived from the perceived beneﬁts in terms of learning effects or
ecurity of energy supply. The contribution of our paper is that we analyse the conditions under which the interaction occurs
r does not occur. In particular, we analyse in which circumstances climate-policy measures such as subsidies for renewables
1 Cournot equilibrium assumes that producers compete in the production quantity while the Supply Function Equilibrium assume that producers compete
y  bidding complete supply functions instead of one single quantity in an oligopolistic market with demand uncertainty.
168 M. Mulder, Y. Zeng / Resource and Energy Economics 54 (2018) 165–185Fig. 1. Framework of a two-country model of the electricity market with climate-policy instruments.
and taxes on fossil-fuel use have an additional reducing effect on carbon emissions when also an emissions-trading scheme
exists.
3. Concise model of the electricity market
In order to analyse the interaction of different types of climate-policy measures, we  develop and apply a concise stylized
two-country model of the electricity market plus a regional emissions-trading scheme. The framework of this model is
depicted in Fig. 1. In the following sections, we introduce the corresponding components in detail.
3.1. Supply side
On the supply side, the electricity market is composed of both centralized and decentralized power producers. The set
of centralized power producers in country c is denoted as Nc = {1, 2, . . .,  nc}. In general, nc is taken to be a small number. For
example, in the Dutch electricity market, there are only a few major electricity producers (ENGIE, E. ON Benelux, Essent (part
of RWE) and Nuon (now subsidiary of Vattenfall)). In most cases, the power market is operated on a hourly basis. Therefore,
we model the electricity market hourly and h ∈ {1, 2, . . .,  24} denotes hours in a day throughout the whole year. The years
are indexed by y ∈ {1, . . ., y¯}. The model is simulated such that “1” represents the current situation and “y¯” denotes the end
year. Note that pcyh is the wholesale price per hour in country c year y.
The energy mix  employed by producers consists of fossil-fuel ﬁred plants (F) including gas and coal-ﬁred plants, wind
turbines (W), solar cells (S) and combined heat and power (H). The energy resources for centralized power producers include
fossil-fuel plants and wind turbines. Note that the difference between fossil-fuel plants and wind turbines is that the costs
on the margin for the wind turbines are almost zero, while the marginal costs for fossil-fuel plants are not zero and also
include CO2 prices. We  do not consider technology upgrades to reduce the marginal costs of fossil-fuel plants as we  may
assume that these are constant in the short term.
Assumption 1. Each centralized power producer i ∈ Nc has the same constant marginal cost mc ∈ R+ for fossil-fuel plants
over year y in country c.
Note that we do allow different fossil-fuel production techniques in these two countries. Hence, the constant marginal
costs might differ between them. The deployment of wind energy mainly depends on the weather conditions and is stochastic,
ex ante. Let wh denote the capacity factor at hour h to exploit the wind energy capacity. Because of the geographical proximity
of neighboring countries, we assume that the production by wind turbines is subject to the same stochastic pattern in both
countries.
Assumption 2. We  assume that wh follows a certain discrete distribution, with realizations 
j
h
∈ R+ and each realization
j
h
has a probability j
h





= 1.Note that qi
cyh
is composed of the production amount by fossil-fuel plants and also wind turbines, hence




































are the production part by fossil-fuel plants and wind turbines, respectively. And the realized wind




× QiWcy . (2)
t the beginning of a certain year, each centralized power producer’s wind energy capacity QiWcy is given and is assumed











cy . The ﬁrms can invest in fossil-fuel generation capacity each year and we  denote Q
F
cy as the investment in
ossil-fuel plants in country c year y.
Because of the large number of decentralized power producers, they are modeled as price-takers which cannot exercise
arket power to inﬂuence wholesale market prices. Hence, the decentralized power producer equalizes their marginal
eneﬁts to their marginal costs. The aggregate decentralized power production (D) only uses combined heat and power
DH), and solar cells (DS). Costs on the margin from wind and solar energies production are assumed to be zero while
ombined heat and power is a side product of the horticultural suppliers, whose main objective is to produce heat for their
reenhouses. We  assume that they have increasing marginal costs (see also Mulder et al., 2015).
ssumption 3. The production amount by combined heat and power qDH
cyh
is assumed to be a linear function of electricity
rices,
qDHcyh = ˛D + ˇDpcyh,
here ˛D > 0 and ˇD > 0.
In addition, the expected production amount by solar cells is the product of the hourly capacity factor and the installed
eneration capacities. Let uh be the expected capacity factor of solar cells at hour h. Hence, we  have the following,
qDScyh = uh × QDScy ,
here QDScy denotes the yearly generation capacity for solar cells. The sum of CHP and solar cells composes the aggregated
roduction amount by fringe suppliers,
qDcyh = ˛cyh + ˇpcyh, (3)
here ˛cyh = ˛D + uh × QDScy and ˇ = ˇD.
.2. Demand side
The demand side of the wholesale electricity market consists of large electricity users (L) and retailers (R). Retailers sell
lectricity further to consumers and prosumers. We  assume a linear demand function for large electricity users as follows:





are parameters to be calculated, tL is the tax rate for large electricity users and h is the hourly network
ariff paid by large electricity users. Hence, we implicitly assume that the tax rate and network tariffs do not change over
ime y.
The retail price is equal to the wholesale market price (pcyh), plus a retail margin (r), taxes (or levies) tR and the dynamic
etwork tariffs h. Hence, the demand function for consumers and prosumers can be speciﬁed as following,





are parameters to be calculated. The aggregation of the demand from large users and retailers induces the
otal demand function faced by producers,
qcyh = qLcyh + qRcyh = ah − bhpcyh, (6)





















ote that by introducing a dynamic network tariff h, we move the aggregate demand function upward or downward on a
ourly basis, but the slope of the aggregate demand function does not change. Therefore, the aggregate demand function
uppresses demand when there is a higher network tariff h and boosts demand when the network tariff is low.
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3.3. Market equilibrium
The wholesale electricity market is modeled as an imperfect market. Facing a certain demand curve, the producers
compete in terms of quantities. The market reaches equilibrium when each producer’s strategy is the best response to
the strategies actually employed by its competitors. Domestic electricity demand is met  by centralized producers and the




qicyh + qDcyh. (7)
And the residual demand faced by i is given by,
qicyh = ah − bhpcyh − q−icyh − ˛cyh − ˇpcyh, (8)
where q−i
cyh
denotes the sum of the other centralized producers’ production amount except i. Note that in the above equation,
we have replaced qD
cyh
by Eq. (3). Rearranging Eq. (8), we obtain,
pcyh =
ah − ˛cyh − qicyh − q−icyh
bh + ˇ
, (9)
In practice, forward contracts play an important role in electricity wholesale markets. Electricity producers sell a part
of their generation in forward markets. Allaz and Vila (1993) have shown that ﬁrms have an incentive to do so as this may
reduce the market power of competitors in the spot market. As a result of the sale of electricity in forward markets, the
competition in the spot markets is more ﬁerce which has a price reducing effect, while the actual production is higher (see
also Mulder et al., 2015). Because of this relationship between forward and spot market competition, we  explicitly control for
the impact of forward markets sales on the actual production level of the strategic players. Hence, we  assume that centralized
power producers are active in the forward market. Let qif
cyh
be the forward trading quantity by ﬁrm i and pf
cyh
be the forward
price. Following Allaz and Vila (1993), “under perfect foresight, equilibrium requires the forward market to be efﬁcient.
This means that the forward price as a function of the forward positions must be equal to the price that will result from
the Cournot competition on the spot market given these positions. Therefore, no arbitrage is possible.” Given the forward
positions by each ﬁrm, ﬁrms compete over the production quantity in the spot market. Hence, the production quantity has
to be solved as a function of the forward positions. Then ﬁrms optimize their forward positions given the quantity solved
from the production period, see Allaz and Vila (1993). Note that in our model part of the production is met  by wind energy.
All the derivations for the optimal production and forward positions are included in Appendix C. We  have the following
results for the market equilibrium,
Proposition 4. Under the following conditions,
1. The decentralized power production is given by Eq. (3);
2. The aggregate demand function is given by Eq. (6);
3. The demand is satisﬁed by centralized power producers and decentralized power production;
4. The ex post production from wind energy is calculated based on actual capacity factor j
h
and generation capacity (Eq. (2));
5. Centralized power producers use both fossil fuels and wind energy (Eq. (1));








− nc(qiWcyh + q−iWcyh )
n2c + 1
; . (10)
From Eq. (10), we can easily see that any production by wind turbines will replace the electricity generation by fossil-fuel
plants for producer i. For each value of the capacity factor for wind turbines j
h
, we would have a corresponding market
equilibrium regarding fossil-fuels production (10) and wholesale prices (9).23.4. International trade and law of one price
In this section, we further investigate how import and export inﬂuence the domestic price, which is determined by (9).
If there are price differences between the two countries, we  assume that traders will proﬁt from export from a lower price
2 In the model calibration and policy analysis, we  also put an additional constraint that the hourly changes within the fossil-fuel electricity production
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ountry to a higher price country.3 For country c, let IEcyh be the net export amount in hour h year y, i.e., export minus import.
et pu
cyh
be the uniform prices between these two  countries together with trading amount IEcyh, hence we  have the following
pucyh =










are solved from Eq. (10) together with the ex ante expected wind energy production.4 In addition, we have
puS,yh = puL,yh, (12)
nd
IES,yh + IEL,yh = 0. (13)
ombining Eqs. (11)–(13), we solve for the corresponding pu
cyh
and IEcyh. In the second step, we check for the capacity
onstraint IU between these two countries. If IES,yh > IU,  then the (absolute) size of the import and export is equal to the
apacity constraint while the different prices pd
cyh














































.5. Carbon market and the interaction with the electricity market
Finally, we add an international carbon permit market to the set of national electricity markets. The electricity industry is
ssumed to be the only participant in this market. Let capy be the carbon emission cap and PCO2y be the average CO2 price.
or each fossil-fuel production technique, the carbon emission coefﬁcient is denoted as ec. In such a setting, the adjusted
onstant marginal costs accy for country c in year y are as follows:
accy = mc + PCO2y × ec. (14)
Given the constant marginal costs accy, we calculate the fossil-fuel production according to Eq. (10). Then we  compare the
ctual aggregated carbon emissions over a period with the emission cap for that period. If the carbon emissions are above
he cap, we keep increasing the carbon prices until the emissions are equal to or below the cap. Hence, the carbon price is
etermined by the cap and the aggregated demand for carbon permits.
.6. Banking of permits
In the EU ETS, allowances can not only be freely used within a phase (the current phase being 2013–2020), but also saved
ntil the next phase. This saving of permits is called banking. In the above analysis we did not control for this banking option.
n order to analyse the impact of banking on the model results, we  also run a sensitivity analysis where ﬁrms can freely
ransfer any permit which is not used to the next period.
This is modelled as follows: if the aggregated level of emissions during a period is below the cap for that period, then
e assume that all unused permits (which is equal to the difference between cap and emissions) is transferred to the next
eriod, raising the actual cap in that period.
3 We do not make any assumption on the type of connection between markets and how traders can make use of cross-border capacity, but we  do take
nto  account the existence of a cross-border constraint. Note that in the ﬁrst step of the calculation, we  allow traders to equalize the prices between these
wo  countries not hindered by a cross-border transmission constraint. In the second step, we control for this constraint.
4 For notational convenience, we denote the two  countries as “L” and “S”.
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Table 1
Parameters chosen for the small and large countries.
Small country Large country
Number of centralized producers 5 8
Constant variable generation costs (Euro/MWh) 35 30
Wind power generation capacity (GW) 2.9 57.5
Solar power generation capacity (GW) 1.1 22.5
4. Numerical analysis
4.1. Parameters, scenarios and policy variants
In order to analyse the interaction effects between climate-policy measures, we  conduct a numerical analysis with our
model. We  refer to a two interconnected region case where we  have a large and small country. Differences in scale of countries
are important in order to better assess international spillover effects from policies implemented in the larger country to the
smaller country. The parameters for both countries are derived from the characteristics of Germany (large) and Netherlands
(small), respectively, just to have a benchmark for the calibration but without the objective of fully representing these
countries or making a speciﬁc policy analysis for these countries. Table 1 lists a brief summary of relevant parameters we
have used in this paper.
According to the Statline database of Statistics Netherlands, the installed capacity for wind energy including onshore
and offshore wind parks is roughly 2.9 GW in 2014.5 Most wind energy production in the Netherlands is run by centralized
power producers. The capacity factor per hour to employ the wind power generation capacity is calculated based on the data
from the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute.6 The installed capacities for wind power generation in Germany are taken
to be about 57.5 GW.  Because of the geographical proximity, the capacity factor of wind energy production in Germany is
assumed to have the same discrete distribution per hour as in the Netherlands.
Decentralized power production mainly refers to CHP and solar energy. The minimum run capacity for CHP in the
Netherlands and Germany is estimated to be 5 GWh. We roughly estimate that ˛D = 5000 and ˇD = 30. The installed solar
generation capacity in 2014 are around 1.1 GW in the Netherlands and 22.5 GW in Germany.7 We  could calculate the solar
cells hourly capacity factor uh based on the historical data from 2006 to 2014.
Details of how we calculate the hourly aggregate demand function are reported in Appendix D. The electricity consump-
tion amount and wholesale prices are based on a load proﬁle. Price elasticities are based on the results in the literature
for the electricity market, see Lijesen (2007). We  have taken hourly price elasticities and in general, a higher elasticity for
off-peak hours and a lower elasticity for peak hours (9–20 h). All hourly elasticities are in the range of −0.3 and −0.2.
In order to keep the model simulations as simple as possible, we approach each year by simulating only 24 consecutive
hours.8 Hence, we ignore weekly and seasonal ﬂuctuations in demand and supply and treat the outcome of a 24-simulation
as representative for all hours in a year. For the simulation of the emission trading scheme, for instance, this means that the
model works with a daily cap and daily price, but this cap and this price must be seen as the annual cap and the average
annual price.
As the supply and demand conditions may  vary strongly over year to year, we work with scenarios regarding wind speed
and demand levels.9 For each wind speed level, we  use a probability, based on empirical evidence for the Netherlands. In
order to deﬁne the hourly probability distribution we use actual hourly data on wind speed. We  rank the hourly data from
lowest to highest level and then determine the average value in three classes: the lowest 31%, the next 38% and the highest
31% of all observations. Table 3 gives the results for the wind speed. For the demand level, we  scale up or down the intercept
ah of the inverse demand function. For each scaling factor, we assign a corresponding probability and this holds for each
hour. Table 2 reports the result for demand level in each hour.
Note that for each hour, we have 3 possible realizations of the wind energy capacity factor and 3 scalings of the demand.
Therefore, we  end up with 9 scenarios for each hour. Running the model for each hour for each scenario, we  obtain for each
hour a probability distribution of all results. This Monto-Carlo type of analysis enables us to deal with the impact of extreme
circumstances, in particular regarding the impact of renewables on the electricity market and the emissions-trading scheme.
5 http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/selection/?DM=SLEN&PA=83109ENG&LA=EN&VW=T accessed on November 5, 2015.
6 http://www.knmi.nl/home.
7 Data source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar power in the Netherlands.
8 Otherwise we  would need to simulate 8760 h per year, which would cost a lot of computation time for a model with imperfect competition with
stochastic distributions of external factors, while adding such complexity is not needed for the purpose of our analysis.
9 The intermittent character of renewables as well as the stochasticity of demand is dealt with by scenarios where we have distributions for both. The
model is run for a number of scenarios. In each scenario a speciﬁc (joint) distribution of wind and demand occurs. Implicitly we  assume that the ﬁrms
have  full certainty about which scenario they are in. In other words, we  implicitly assume that there is no deviation between the expectations for the short
run  and the realisation. Hence, one can also say that we  ignore the problems of balancing and programme responsibility. We believe we can ignore these
issues,  as that would complicate the analysis tremendously, while it is not needed for the objective or our analysis.
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Table  2
Inverse demand intercept scaling factors.





Wind power capacity factor with probabilities in each hour.
Hour Low capacity with prob 0.31 Medium capacity with prob 0.38 High capacity with prob 0.31
1 0.005 0.056 0.397
2  0.005 0.056 0.397
3  0.005 0.056 0.397
4  0.005 0.056 0.423
5  0.005 0.056 0.397
6  0.007 0.063 0.423
7  0.008 0.071 0.451
8  0.011 0.089 0.479
9  0.013 0.110 0.541
10  0.016 0.121 0.573
11  0.023 0.146 0.607
12  0.027 0.160 0.642
13  0.032 0.171 0.678
14  0.032 0.174 0.678
15  0.032 0.160 0.642
16  0.027 0.146 0.607
17  0.020 0.121 0.541
18  0.016 0.099 0.479
19  0.011 0.080 0.451
20  0.008 0.071 0.418
21  0.007 0.063 0.423
22  0.007 0.063 0.423
23  0.005 0.056 0.397
24  0.005 0.056 0.397
Table 4




No Baseline Baseline LowCap Baseline HighCap















cSmall country CarbonTax S
CarbonTax or Subsidy RES No Baseline noRES
Using the above data for the determination of the starting values of the model as well as the probability distributions
or the exogenous circumstances, we simulate the electricity market for a period of 15 periods, covering the period 2016 -
030. Now, we  consider 8 policy variants as described in Table 4.
In the “Baseline” variant it is assumed that both countries annually increase the renewable-energy capacity while also a
nternational cap-and-trade emissions trade system exists. The annual increase in RES capacity is based on the assumption
hat 10% of electricity tax revenues is used to ﬁnance the subsidies for these investments. The initial carbon emission cap
evel is chosen to be 1.04 Mtons per day, which is about equal to the aggregated daily emissions by the power industry in
ermany and the Netherlands. In the “Baseline”, we assume that the cap is reduced by 0.5% annually. In the policy variants
LowCap” and “HighCap” the cap is annually reduced by 1% and 0.25% respectively. We are in particular interested in the
ffects of introducing a carbon tax in relation to the tightness of the emissions trading scheme which is represented by
he initial level of the cap. In the variants with a carbon tax it is assumed that the larger country imposes a carbon tax of
1.25 euro/MWh on fossil-fuel generation plants.10 In order to compare the results of the carbon tax, we  compare three pairs
f variants: Baseline vs CarbonTax L, Baseline LowCap vs CarbonTax L LowCap, Baseline HighCap vs CarbonTax L HighCap.
his allows us to examine the effects of a fossil-fuel tax given different levels of the cap on carbon emission and given a more
r less exogenous autonomous growth in renewable-energy capacity. We  also compare the variants Baseline, CarbonTax L
10 According to the CO2 emissions coefﬁcients tons per MWh,  we  have taken 0.3 for gas-ﬁred plants and 0.6 for coal-ﬁred plants in the simulation. For
 portofolio of 50% coal-ﬁred and 50% gas-ﬁred fossil-fuel plants with a carbon price of 25 euro per ton, we choose a level of 11.25 euro per MWh  for the
arbon taxes on top of the fossil-fuel production.
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and CarbonTax S to assess the impact of a producer tax in the small country compared to a producer tax in the larger country.
Finally, in order to analyse the interaction between the emissions trading scheme and subsidies for renewable energy, we also
compare the results of the variants Baseline vs Baseline noRES. In the former policy variants, emissions trading is combined
with subsidies for renewable energy, while in the latter the only climate policy implemented is the emission trading scheme.
4.2. Results
We  ﬁrst present the numerical results for the “Baseline”, which is the scenario where both countries stimulate RES by
giving subsidies for investments, while also an international cap-and-trade system exists. We  are interested in the following
metrics: the wholesale electricity prices, the hourly RES production, the utilisation of fossil-fuel plants (deﬁned as average
hourly production in percentage of installed capacity), the CO2 prices and, ﬁnally, the CO2 emissions. Then, we compare this
Baseline with the Baseline noRES where no subsidies for RES are included. Next, we consider the variant of “Prodtax” which
imposes a fossil-fuel tax in the large country on top of the “Baseline”. Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by changing
the emission cap level.11
4.2.1. Baseline
As a result of an exogenous stimulation of investments in renewable energy capacity in the “Baseline” variant, this
capacity increases strongly. As a consequence, the volatility in the supply by renewables increases strongly as well (Fig. 2).
This is related to the fact that the hourly production level by renewables is sometimes close to zero in case of unfavourable
weather circumstances independent of the size of installed capacity. Hence, the lowest level of production by renewable
energy capacity is hardly affected by the size of this capacity, while the maximum level is strongly related to this (Fig. 2).
On average, the hourly renewable energy production is much higher in 2030 compared with the level in 2016. This strong
increase in RES capacity fairly well resembles the actual developments in many European countries. The utilisation of fossil-
fuel plants in both countries goes down as a result of the increase in RES, see Fig. 13. In addition, the annual reduction in the
carbon emission cap raises the scarcity of carbon permits and, hence, the carbon price, see Figs. 4 and 5 . Due to the different
size of the initial installed generation capacities, the marginal production is more often run by the RES in the large country
and less often in the small country. In the latter country, the upward price effect of the increasing carbon prices dominates
the price-reducing effect of the increasing share of RES. As a result, the strong increase of RES signiﬁcantly reduces the price
of electricity (as in the large country), but this appears not to be the case in the small country (see Fig. 3). As the cross-border
capacity has a limited size, traders are not able to fully beneﬁt from these price differences. The remaining price differences
indicate that this capacity is fully utilized.
4.2.2. Subsidies renewable energy
Before analyzing the interaction between carbon taxes, emissions trading and subsidies for renewables, we  ﬁrst analyze
the interaction between the latter two climate policy instruments. The carbon price is signiﬁcantly higher in the latter
variant, as is shown by Fig. 8. This higher price is needed as without subsidies for renewable energy the carbon price needs
to do the work to keep the emissions below the cap. Because of the volatility in the carbon prices due to the ﬂuctuations
in external circumstances (wind and demand), the carbon price may  become (close to) zero now and then as is shown by
11 Note for Figs. 3–6 : the thickest lines denote the variants with the default cap (“Baseline” and “Prodtax”), the thinnest lines denote the variants
with  the higher cap (“Baseline HighCap” and “Prodtax HighCap”) and the lines with intermediate thickness denote the variants with the lower cap
(“Baseline Lowecap” and “Prodtax LowCap”).
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Fig. 3. Average daily wholesale price, large and small country, per variant, 2016–2030.
Fig. 4. Average CO2 price, per variant 2016–2030.
Fig. 5. Aggregated daily CO2 emissions, per variant, 2016–2030.
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Fig. 6. Duration curve of average daily CO2 price, per variant, 2030.
Fig. 7. CO2 emissions, large and small country, per variant, 2016–2030.
Fig. 8. CO2 price in Baseline and Baseline noRES, 2016–2030.
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wFig. 10. CO2 emissions in Baseline and Baseline noRES, 2016–2030.
ig. 9. Fig. 10 shows the emissions in the Baseline variant, with both emissions trading and renewable energy investments,
nd the emissions in the Baseline noRES variant where emissions trading is the only policy instrument. It appears that in
he latter variant the emission levels are higher, which indicates that the subsidies for investments in renewable do have an
dditional effect on emissions, which is caused by the fact that the waterbed effect does not occur when the carbon price is
ero.
.2.3. Carbon tax
Now, the question is what happens if the large country introduces a carbon tax on top of the measures stimulating the
ES capacity and the international emissions trading system. The direct effect is that the generation costs of the fossil-fuel
ower plants in this country increase. As both countries are connected, the increase in generation costs in the large country
mplies that this country wants to import from the smaller country in those hours when RES capacity is not setting the price.
s a result, production shifts to the smaller country. The introduction of a carbon tax in the large country raises the utilisation
f fossil-fuel capacity in the small country (see Fig. 13). Hence, the introduction of a carbon tax in one country results in a
arbon leakage. This effect is relatively large when the tax is implemented in the large country (Fig. 7) This international
pillover effect of national climate policies also raises the electricity price in the other country, as we  observe a price increase
n both countries compared with the “Baseline” (Fig. 3).
If the carbon tax is introduced in the small country instead of the large country, the similar type of effects occur albeit
maller. The impact on the CO2 prices in the region is much smaller, while also the impact on the overall emissions of CO2
s smaller (Fig. 11). When the small country introduces the carbon tax, the share of renewables in the domestic production
ncreases relatively strongly, while the share in the large country is hardly affected (Fig. 12).
The shift in the location of the production by fossil-fuel plants does, however, not mean that there is no effect on the
rice of carbon (Fig. 4). The introduction of a carbon tax in one country results in a lower (average) CO2 price which implies
hat the overall demand for permits has been reduced. The negative impact of the carbon tax on the carbon price shows the
xistence of the waterbed effect: the emissions trading system becomes less effective if a carbon tax is introduced. However,
e also see that the overall level of carbon emissions is lower when we have a carbon tax, which indicates that the waterbed
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Fig. 11. CO2 price and emissions, in Baseline and variants with carbon tax, 2016–2030.Fig. 12. Share of RES in domestic generation, large and small country, per variant, 2016–2030.
effect does not fully neutralize the effect of the carbon tax. This result is related to the fact that the price of CO2 may be zero
from time to time (Fig. 6). If the price of CO2 is zero any other reduction in the demand for carbon permits cannot have any
effect on the price anymore. Hence, we ﬁnd that the combination of different policy measures to reduce carbon emissions
may still be effective despite the interaction effects.











mFig. 13. Utilisation of fossil-fuel capacity, Baseline and variant with carbon tax in large country, large and small country, 2016–2030.
.2.4. Welfare effects of carbon tax
Imposing a carbon tax raises the marginal costs of electricity production which increases the electricity price. As a result
onsumers have to pay more, which reduces their consumer surplus. As the impact of the carbon tax on electricity prices
s the biggest in the domestic market, because of cross-border capacity constraints, the consumer welfare is most strongly
ffected by the domestic carbon tax (Fig. 14).
Remarkably the producer surplus increases as a result of the carbon tax. Although the carbon tax raises the costs of the
onventional producers, the producers of RES do not have to pay this tax, but they do beneﬁt from the resulting electricity
rices. Hence, both consumers and RES producers beneﬁt from the introduction of a carbon tax, while the producers of
onventional power faces a loss in terms of lower production levels and lower proﬁts per unit.
.2.5. Sensitivity analysis
When we lower the emission cap, subsequently we  observe a lower carbon emission level and a higher carbon price
Fig. 4). Because of the higher carbon price, we ﬁnd higher electricity wholesale prices in the small country: the price-
educing effect of the increase in RES capacity is completely neutralized by the price-increasing effect of the tighter carbon
arket (see Fig. 3). We  also observe a stronger spillover effect of a carbon tax on fossil-fuel production: the utilisation of the
Fig. 14. Change in consumer and producer surplus in two  variants compared to the Baseline, in both countries in 2030.
180 M. Mulder, Y. Zeng / Resource and Energy Economics 54 (2018) 165–185Fig. 15. Utilisation of fossil-fuel capacity in the Baseline LowCap and CarbonTax LowCap, 2016–2030.
fossil-fuel plants increases more strongly due to the introduction of the carbon tax in one country (see Fig. 15). This implies
that in case of tighter emissions-trading system, the international spillover effect of national policies, like a carbon tax, are
larger. More importantly, because of the stronger effect on the CO2 prices, there is less effect on CO2 emissions (see Fig. 5).
This is related to the fact that in case of a lower cap the carbon prices are less often zero which makes it possible to stronger
obtain the waterbed effect which neutralizes emission reductions resulting from the carbon tax.
When we add the possibility of banking permits and using them in the next period, the results remain basically the same
(Fig. 16). In case of banking, the CO2 price appears to be zero in both the Baseline and the policy variant with a carbon tax. This
result follows from the fact that banking can result in a higher supply in the next period when there is an oversupply in the
previous one. Hence, banking can make the redundancy of the emission trading scheme even stronger. As a consequence,
introducing a carbon tax when the emissions trading market is loose, for instance because of the possibility of banking,
this combination of climate-policy measures may  result in a reduction of carbon emissions. The general lesson here is that
regulatory measures which make the cap in the emissions trading scheme less binding, may  reduce the waterbed effect.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored the conditions under which interaction effects occur between different types of climate-
policy measures. Governments are combining different types of policy measures in order to realise their ambitious objectives
regarding the reduction of carbon emissions. It is well established in the literature that the combined effect may  be lower
than the sum of the individual effects. Combining subsidies for renewable energy or taxes on fossil fuels together with a
cap-and-trade system suffers from the waterbed effect. Moreover, national policies to reduce domestic emissions may  be
offset by international spillover effects. The question we have explored is whether this offsetting effect always occurs or
whether it may  be subject to speciﬁc conditions. This topic is relevant because in the EU, each country has the freedom to
choose its own national energy policy despite of European climate-policy objectives. European countries apply a mixture
of different types of policy measures which make it highly relevant to analyze the nature of and the conditions for the
interaction effects.
Using a numerical partial two-country equilibrium model of the power market which also includes a cap-and-trade
carbon system, we ﬁnd spillover effects due to the integration of the two  markets. Imposing a fossil-fuel tax in one country
leads to a higher cost for fossil-fuel producers. Hence, this country imports more from the neighboring country. As a result
of this, we observe a higher utilization of fossil-fuel capacity in the neighboring country. The spillover effects are smaller
when the carbon tax is introduced in the small country instead of in the large country. Both the CO2 price and the overall
CO2 emissions in the region are less affected then when the large country implements a carbon tax. The lower the cap
in the emissions-trading system, the stronger this effect appears to be. This result indeed shows that national policies to
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ieduce carbon emissions may  be offset by international spillover effects. Coordination of such policies may  improve the
ffectiveness of such policies.
However, we ﬁnd that the waterbed effect does not always hold. It appears that adding other climate-policy measures to
n emissions-trading system may  have a net effect on the level of carbon emissions. This result comes from the fact that the
arbon price in the trading scheme has a ﬂoor, i.e. it can never be lower than zero. If subsidies for renewable energy result
n a large amount of renewable-energy capacity this may  in some periods result in an overall demand for carbon permits
eing below the supply of permits which brings the carbon price to zero. In such circumstances, giving more subsidies for
enewables or imposing a tax of fossil fuel reduce the emissions by fossil-fuel plants without being neutralized by a waterbed
ffect. Hence, we ﬁnd that the waterbed effect only holds if the cap-and-trade system is constantly binding, which means
hat there is always a positive price for the carbon permits. The probability of always binding emissions-trading system,
owever, reduces if countries keep increasing the size of installed RES capacity as is currently the case in many European
ountries. Moreover, a similar effect may  occur if regulatory measures are taken which make the emissions-trading scheme
ess tight, such as banking which increases the time ﬂexibility of participants within the scheme. The policy consequence of
his ﬁnding is that national climate policies such as subsidy schemes for renewables may  have a positive effect on reduction
f carbon emissions, although the general literature says that such cannot be the case when an emissions-trading scheme
xists.
These ﬁndings are based on a numerical analysis of a concise model of the electricity market. The numerical simulations
o not enable us to draw general conclusions, as the ﬁndings may  be sensitive to the chosen parameter values. Nevertheless,
 numerical application of a model does give insights in the interrelationships of a number of factors affecting the market.
ecause of its theoretical and stylized nature, this model analysis does not give precise estimates of the size of the rela-
ionships and the probability of the situations in which the interaction effect do not occur. Although the model has a rather
etailed representation of the electricity sector, it largely ignores the sector’s interactions with the rest of the economy,
uch as fossil fuel production, aggregate investment and employment. Such interactions are also important for evaluating
he effectiveness of climate policies. Empirical research is needed to obtain precise estimates for the magnitude of actual
nteraction effects between current climate-change policies.
As we only focused on the occurrence and absence of interaction effects of different type of climate policies, we did not
iscuss the efﬁciency of these interaction effects. Although adding a carbon tax on top of an emissions trading scheme may
esult in more emissions reductions as the waterbed effect does not always work, this does not mean that such a policy is
fﬁcient. In order to analyse the efﬁciency effects of climate policies, a more general equilibrium approach is needed taking
nto account more kinds of interactions within the economy.
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Appendix A. Fossil fuel plants investment
When the expected production by Renewable Energy Supply (RES) is low or zero, the need for fossil fuel production
might exceed the current generation capacity. As a result of this, electricity scarcity prices occur, see also ten Cate and
Lijesen (2004). In the fossil-fuel investment decisions, we also take import and export into account. Electricity importing
companies are modelled as price-takers. Let qI
yh
be the total electricity import. Following Mulder et al. (2015), the supply of
the importers is approximated by a linear supply function,
qIcyh = ıpcyh, (15)
and the export amount by ﬁrm i is qiE
cyh
. We  have the following equation for scarcity prices,







qiEcyh = ah − bhpcyh. (16)




on the left-hand side of Eq.











denotes the electricity export amount which is modelled exogenously. The right-hand side of Eq.
(16) denotes the aggregate demand at a certain electricity price level.
The fossil-fuel plants investments QFcy are considered in a competitive setting in which ﬁrms cannot behave strategically
and exercise market power. Assuming perfect foresight, expected long-run marginal revenues should be equal to long-run
marginal costs. Following ten Cate and Lijesen (2004), we  have the following: the price per MWh  which is required to keep
demand down to capacity (Eq. (16)), minus marginal running costs per MWh,  accumulated over the hours during which
capacity is a binding constraint, equals the incremental annualized cost of building an extra MW.  Suppose the annualized
















⎥⎦ = cF , (17)
where mc denotes the constant fossil fuel production costs. The expression {qFcyh = QFcy + QFcy} denotes the set of hours when
the capacity constraint is binding. Hence, the investment in fossil-fuel plants QFcy should be set at a level that equalizes
expected marginal beneﬁts (LHS of Eq. (17)) and marginal costs (RHS of Eq. (17)).
Appendix B. RES investment
We  assume that the investments in RES depend on government subsidies. Suppose the RES subsidy budget for wind
parks is BWcy and the budget for solar cells is B
S
cy. Moreover, we  assume that the budget is ﬁnanced by a tax on electricity
consumption. The investment costs for wind parks and solar cells are denoted by cWy and c
S
y , respectively. The newly installed










Appendix C. Optimal production amount by centralized power producers
The electricity market is modelled as a market with imperfect competition where the supply is determined by a limited
number of strategic suppliers and a fringe supply consisting of weather dependent wind and solar production as well as CHP
production which acts as a price taker. The strategic suppliers, which are supposed to have both fossil-fuel plants and wind
turbines, compete in quantities (Cournot competition). The suppliers sell their production in both forward and spot markets.
Each ﬁrm has an incentive to maximize revenues in forward markets as this reduces the market power of other ﬁrms in the
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pot market (Allaz and Vila, 1993). In order to determine the optimal production quantity by the strategic players using their
ossil-fuel plants, we need to estimate the amount sold in the forward markets. First we  determine the optimal production
iven the strategic game in the spot market and then determine how this depends on the forward sales. After determining
he marginal impact of forward sales on the optimum production amount, we  are able to determine the optimal production
evel.






















bh+ˇ . The ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrm i read,



















− mc = 0, (18)
q. (18) holds for every ﬁrm i and we can write the system of equations for the ﬁrst order conditions of each producer into
atrix form as follows:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
2 1 · · · 1
1 2 · · · 1
1 1 · · · 1
·  · · · · · · · · · · ·

















ah − ˛cyh + q1fcyh − q−1Wcyh − 2q1Wcyh + mc(bh + ˇ)
ah − ˛cyh + q2fcyh − q−2Wcyh − 2q2Wcyh − mc(bh + ˇ)
· · ·
· · ·




he above matrix solve qiF
cyh
, i ∈ Nc as a function of q1fcyh, q
2f
cyh
, . . .,  qncf
cyh




, i, j ∈ Nc , i.e., the
ind power generation is also symmetric among all producers. We  solve the above matrix and obtain the following solution
or the optimal generation by fossil-fuel plants of i, i ∈ Nc,
qiFcyh =
ah − ˛cyh + qifcyh − q−iWcyh − 2qiWcyh −
∑







− mc(bh + ˇ)
n + 1 ,  i, j ∈ Nc. (19)












n + 1 , (21)
here i, j ∈ Nc and j /= i.
Now we move to the stage of ﬁrms choosing the optimal forward positions. According to Allaz and Vila (1993), we have



















ccording to the arbitrage condition, it should hold that pf
cyh














.13 For notational convenience, we suppress the expectation sign for qiW
cyh
from now on.






bh+ˇ . Taking ﬁrst order conditions with respect to q
if
cyh
, we  obtain the following equation for ﬁrm i,
(















































are given by (20) and (21), respectively. Due to the fact that ﬁrms are symmetric in terms of their
constant variable costs, their ﬁnal production amounts in the equilibrium should be the same as well. Plugging Eqs. (19)–(21)








− nc(qiWcyh + q−iWcyh )
n2c + 1
, (23)
Appendix D. Calculation of the aggregate demand function
Suppose we want to calculate the aggregate hourly dependent demand function,
qcyh = ah − bhpcyh,
and the objective is to calculate parameters ah and bh. Given the price elasticities εh in the literature and observed quantity








⇒ bh = εh
Q˜cyh
p˜cyh
, ah = Q˜cyh + bhp˜cyh.
Note that the above formula is implemented to calculate the aggregate demand function in the small country and the
aggregate demand function for the large country is obtained by scaling up the demand function of the small country.
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